We are not surprised, therefore, to discover in Newman a basic predisposition to concern himself with those mental processes which aspire to something other than the mere copying of existence: imagination and conscience, delight, compunction, and wonder. The implication of this for Newman's epistemology is apparent: since the world as it really is, is unknowable, we are justified in believing, as if we knew it, that the world is like what, in our hearts, we want it to be: it is beautiful because we are imaginative; it is holy because we are conscientious. If the rationalist reduces ontology to logic, Newman leaves himself open to the charge of reducing it to psychology: of substituting his own mental processes for the world of nature. His problem becomes, then, the reconciliation of Reason, which proves its amoral object, and Feeling, which is powerless to show its own value.
This conflict between intellect and emotion not only supplies the central issue and the substance of whatever may be said to be explicitly epistemological in Newman, but also characterizes to some extent his method and manner in many of his works. There is repeated shuttling from a de mand that we be reasonable to a justification of emotional activity. And passages which shine with a logical defense of irrationality are as numerous as those which plead emo tionally for bright reason. Newman felt that there was "an intellectual cowardice in not having a basis in reason for my belief."3 Further, he asserted that "few minds can re main at ease without some sort of rational grounds for their religious belief; to reconcile theory and fact is almost an instinct of the mind."^ He was led, he says, to preach "earnestly against the danger of being swayed by our sym pathy rather than our reason in religious inquiry.
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On the other hand, he knows that "men go by their sympa thies, not by a r g u m e n t s . "6 The theme of his Grammar of Assent is that belief or knowledge is arrived at not pri marily by rational processes, but by "the whole man"-his emotions, memories, etc., and in Oxford Sermon Number X Newman includes even "prejudices." Here is a sample of I Newman's eloquent anti-intellectualism: "While we talk Apologia, p. 
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B-5 logic, we are unanswerable; but then, on the other hand, thi^ universal living scene of things is after all as little a logical world as it is a poetical; and, as it cannot without violence be exalted into poetical perfection, neither can it be attenuated into a logical f o r m u l a . i n defiance of its own instructions, the ideas of the Grammar are unfolded, apparently, in a carefully logical way. On closer study, however, the fervent defence of faith is seen to justify the comment of one writer; in the Grammar "there is a com plete absence of scientific formalism, of adequate defini tions and divisions, of clear-cut distinctions and a strictly logical order.
A homiletic style stirs and edifies: but enlightenment needs a method more exact than Newman's purposes require. Consequently, the problem of arriving at his systematic thought on epistemology is complicated by his mixing to gether elements that to the logician's mind will not mix, then blandly damning logic with faint praise, and topping all by charming with a style that even the logician admits is persuasive. Hence, our approach to Newman's theory of knowledge must be by way of an examination into assumptions and implications: his explicit statements are too watery. In the meantime, however, it seems that Newman must be aware of this ability which is at once his genius and his weakness. One of his major theoretic concerns throughout his career is with what he calls "the logical cogency of faith." It is only the reason in fallen human wills that he speaks against; genuine, scholastic reason, reason "when correctly exercised," is basic, as he says, to Christian and Catholic philosophy.
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Newman espoused, as we should expect a Christian priest and scholar to do, the classical realism of Aristotle and Aquinas, the main tenets of which are the attainability of truth, the validity of the ordinary sources of knowledge, the value of the senses for acquiring knowledge of the material world, and above all, the ultimacy of reason. His bent for the practical and the concrete was fed by Aristotle's stress on the actual as against the abstract.10 
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Newman proceeds frequently in a scholastic vein: "When I speak of knowledge, I mean something intellectual, something which grasps what it perceives through the senses; . . . which sees more than the senses convey, which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea."H Coexistent with this rationalistic strain in Newman's nature is a strongly empirical one. He was a great admirer of Locke. Of course, he must deny that philosopher's notion that assent should be exactly proportioned to infer ence, yet he found much in the English empiricist with which he could agree: e.g., the value of logic for Newman is expressed in Locke's assertion that "syllogism, at its best, is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge we have, without making any addition to it;" the syllogism, he continues, is "not the only nor the best way of reason ing;" "man knows first, and then only is able to prove syllogistically." Together with Butler, it was Locke who suggested to Newman his notion that probabilities could so converge and concatenate as to lead to practical certainty. The nominalism of both men is striking; Locke's empirical theory led him to consider abstract ideas as mere names; Newman's temperamental affinity for the concrete finds repeated expression: "In this world of sense we have to do with things far more than notions."12 No one has felt the force of nominalism in its implica tions for religious belief more strongly than Pascal. Underlying his famous aphorism, "the heart hath reasons of its own, which the reason cannot know," is the same distrust that Newman held for the capacity of mere ratiocination ever to pass from tautology over to any living reality. Some thing other than the mind's power to connect identities must be touched in order to produce belief. Thus, against the scientist's blessing upon "the duty to doubt," the nominalist, who is also religious, will stress the "will to believe*" And with Dewey when he states that "judg-" ment is not logical at all, but personal and psychological." It is remarkable that Newman, with the heavy baggage of theological assumption, was able, literally, to feel his way through to the insight of this modern philosophical school: it is a tribute to his genius that in a church which has always valued its Aquinases above its Augustines, he preached with success the value of human experience above human reason. The Cardinal's "Alexandrian Mysticism" has been the subject of much comment by critics. When he began to study the early fathers for his history of Arianism, he was fas cinated by "the broad philosophy of Clement and Origen." He seems to have been particularly impressed by their disdain j for the sensuous and inferential approaches to truth. In i setting forth their doctrine for his book, he refers i approvingly to the Alexandrian teaching that the external ! world "beguiles the imagination of most men with a harmless but unfounded belief in matter as distinct from the senses." Newman notices further the Alexandrian notion that the argument from final causes is meant only for the multitude, as teaching the existence of God, who "after all dwells intelligibly, prior to argument, in their heart and 1 6
conscience." Such, passages as these anticipate the theme of Newman's later Grammar of Assent, in which he attempts to put in an ordered fashion the theoretic basis of h±s views on belief and knowledge.
The struggle to establish the "logical cogency of faith"-to reconcile in a single view the demands of philosophy for rationality and the claims of action for beliefculminated for Newman in the publication of what may be considered his most original work. The Grammar of Assent attempts to show that we do not discredit ourselves in certain acts of assent, but are simply following psychologi cal laws which bring certitude in all fields.
The first Part of the Grammar treats of assent and apprehension; the second Part contrasts assent and inference and singles out for special treatment the faculty of "implicit reasoning," which is defined as the "illative sense." The doctrine of implicit reasoning had been fore shadowed in certain of Newman's University sermons; the believer, untrained in logic, possesses, nevertheless, the grounds that logic would give him because his faith reasons subconsciously for him; and even after this reasoning is set forth in logical fullness as "explicit reasoning," it is never adequate to account for all that was b e l i e v e d . -* -7
The most important part of the Grammar is its presenta tion of the doctrine of the illative sense. Newman's problem is to get from inference to assent, from probability to certitude: ordinary logic cannot bridge the gap; ordinary reason declares that any number of probabilities is insufficient for certitude. Hence, he developed the notion of a moral and psychological "illative sense. 
